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BRIDGING ERIE: CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL




Of all the decisions in the Supreme Court's recent international term,'
Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain2 is likely to prove the most significant. This is not
just because it endorsed the Filartiga line of cases, 3 allowing suits in U.S.
t Professor of Law, University of California, Hastings College of the Law. This article is an
expanded version of remarks given at International Law and the 2003-04 Supreme Court
Term: Building Bridges or Constructing Barriers Between National, Foreign, and
International Law? My thanks to Beth Stephens and Carlos Vazquez for comments on an
earlier draft. I should disclose that I participated in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain by filing an
amicus brief in support of Respondents. See Brief of Professors of Federal Jurisdiction and
Legal History as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents, reprinted in 28 HASTINGS INT'L
& COMP. L. REV. 95 (2004).
1. In addition to the Sosa case discussed below, the international cases decided by the
Supreme Court during the October Term 2003 include: Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 124 S. Ct. 2711
(2004) (proper district for filing habeas petition to challenge detention of U.S. citizen as
enemy combatant); Rasul v. Bush, 124 S. Ct. 2686 (2004) (jurisdiction over aliens held at
Guantanamo Bay); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633 (2004) (authority to hold U.S.
citizen as enemy combatant); Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 124 S. Ct. 2466
(2004) (discovery for use in foreign proceedings); F. Hoffman-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran
S.A., 124 S. Ct. 2359 (2004) (extraterritorial application of U.S. antitrust law); Republic of
Austria v. Altmann, 124 S. Ct. 2240 (2004) (retroactive application of Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act); Dep't of Transp. v. Public Citizen, 124 S. Ct. 2204 (2004) (applicability of
environmental impact statements to actions required by NAFTA); Olympic Airways v.
Husain, 540 U.S. 644 (2004) (treaty interpretation).
2. 124 S. Ct. 2739 (2004).
3. See, e.g., Abebe-Jira v. Negewo, 72 F.3d 844 (11th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 830
(1996); Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 518 U.S. 1005 (1996);
Hilao v. Estate of Marcos, 25 F.3d 1467 (9th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1126 (1995);
Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
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courts for human rights abuses abroad,4 but also because of what Sosa has
to say about the place of customary international law in the U.S. legal
system. Indeed, Sosa may stand with Sabbatino' as one of the Court's
seminal decisions on the relationship between international and U.S.
domestic law. Sosa has built a bridge between international and domestic
law.' The decision reaffirmed that "the domestic law of the United States
recognizes the law of nations"7 and characterized customary international
law as "federal common law' 8 for purposes of the Alien Tort Statute
(ATS).9 But Sosa's is also a distinctive bridge, and worth examining
further for clues about where it might lead.
I would like to make two basic observations about the architecture of
the bridge that Sosa has built. First, it is a narrow bridge. Although the
Supreme Court held that federal courts may apply customary international
law as federal common law in cases under the ATS, it also suggested that
federal courts should not apply customary international law as federal
common law under the general federal-question statute.'0 The Court
seems inclined to address the role of customary international law in the
U.S. legal system issue-by-issue, incorporating it for some purposes but not
others. Second, Sosa's bridge is made of both historical and modern struts.
The Court found support for allowing federal courts to apply the law of
nations under the ATS in the history of that provision and in the First
Congress's understanding of the law of nations." Yet the Court also
recognized that the U.S. legal system has changed significantly since
4. See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 124 S. Ct. 2739, 2765-66 (2004) (characterizing the
decision as "generally consistent with the reasoning of many of the courts and judges who
faced the issue before it reached this Court" and citing Filartiga).
5. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
6. Although the opinions in Sosa spoke of a "door" between international and domestic
law, see, e.g., Sosa, 124 S. Ct. at 2764 ("Whereas Justice SCALIA sees these developments
as sufficient to close the door to further independent judicial recognition of actionable
international norms, other considerations persuade us that the judicial power should be
exercised on the understanding that the door is still ajar subject to vigilant doorkeeping...
."); id. at 2774 (Scalia, J., concurring) ("The general common law was the old door. We do
not close that door today, for the deed was done in Erie.... Federal common law is a new
door. The question is not whether that door will be left ajar, but whether this Court will
open it."), a bridge seems a more apt metaphor.
7. Id. at 2764.
8. Id. at 2765.
9. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000).
10. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2000). See Sosa, 124 S. Ct. at 2765, n.19. Compare Illinois v.
Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 100 (1972) ("1331 jurisdiction will support claims founded upon
federal common law as well as those of a statutory origin").
11. Sosa, 124 S. Ct. at 2754-61.
[Vol. 12:1
BRIDGING ERIE
ratification of the Constitution and passage of the first Judiciary Act, and
that modern developments might alter the proper role of customary
international law within that system. 2 Sosa links not just the international
with the domestic, but the past with the present.
Part II of this Article places the Sosa decision in context by reviewing
the recent controversy over the role of customary international law in the
U.S. legal system. Part III focuses on the Sosa decision itself, examining
the Court's particularized approach to the incorporation of customary
international law and its two-part methodology. Part IV then applies this
two-part methodology to some of the questions that Sosa left unresolved,
including the status of customary international law under Article III of the
U.S. Constitution and the Supremacy Clause of Article VI. A brief
conclusion follows.
II. THE CONTROVERSY OVER CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW
To set the Sosa decision in context, it is appropriate to review the
recent controversy over the status of customary international law in the
United States.13  There is widespread agreement that, when the
Constitution was adopted and the First Judiciary Act was passed, the law
of nations was understood to be general common law, which was binding
on both federal and state courts.14 Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in
12. Id. at 2761-65.
13. The recent controversy began with an article by Professors Curtis Bradley and Jack
Goldsmith, Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary International Law as
Federal Common Law: A Critique of the Modern Position, 110 HARV. L. REV. 815 (1997),
although earlier articles had made some of the same points. See, e.g., A.M. Weisburd, State
Courts, Federal Courts, and International Cases, 20 YALE J. INT'L L. 1 (1995); Phillip R.
Trimble, A Revisionist View of Customary International Law, 33 UCLA L. REV. 665 (1986).
For responses to the Bradley-Goldsmith critique, see, e.g., Ernest A. Young, Sorting Out
the Debate Over Customary International Law, 42 VA. J. INT'L L. 365 (2002); Harold
Hongju Koh, Is International Law Really State Law?, 111 HARV. L. REV. 1824 (1998); Beth
Stephens, The Law of Our Land: Customary International Law As Federal Law After Erie,
66 FORDHAM L. REV. 393 (1997); Gerald L. Ncuman, Sense and Nonsense About
Customary International Law: A Response to Professors Bradley and Goldsmith, 66
FORDHAM L. REV. 371 (1997).
14. See, e.g., Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 13, at 824 ("the law of nations ... had the
legal status of general common law"); Stewart Jay, The Status of the Law of Nations in
Early American Law, 42 VAND. L. REV. 819, 832-33 (1989) ("in appropriate situations, the
'general' law (of which the law of nations was a part) prevailed, and thus the country was
bound by it") [hereinafter The Status of Law of Nations]; William A. Fletcher, The General
Common Law and Section 34 of the Judiciary Act of 1789: The Example of Marine
Insurance, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1513, 1517 (1984) ("the general law was not attached to any
2004]
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Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins," there was no need to classify the law of
nations as either federal or state law. As Professor Henkin has noted,
"[e]arly in our history, the question whether international law was state
law or federal law was not an issue: it was 'the common law.""..6 Erie, of
course, did away with the regime of general common law and put in its
place a system in which the common law was generally state law, with
limited enclaves of federal common law. 7 The new question was where
customary international law fit in.
A. The Orthodox View
The orthodox view is that customary international law became an
enclave of federal common law. One year after Erie, Professor Philip
Jessup argued that the decision had "no direct application to international
law."18  "Any question of applying international law in our courts," he
wrote, "involves the foreign relations of the United States and can thus be
brought within a federal power.... It would be as unsound as it would be
unwise to make our state courts our ultimate authority for pronouncing the
rules of international law."' 9 In Sabbatino, the Supreme Court seemed to
endorse Jessup's position,0 and stated that an issue concerned with a basic
choice regarding the competence and function of the Judiciary and the
National Executive in ordering our relationships with other members of
the international community must be treated exclusively as an aspect of
federal law.' Thus, as summarized in the Restatement (Third) of Foreign
Relations Law, the orthodox view is that "[c]ustomary international law is
particular sovereign; rather, it existed by common practice and consent among a number of
sovereigns").
15. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
16. Louis Henkin, International Law as Law in the United States, 82 MICH. L. REv. 1555,
1557 (1984).
17. See, e.g., Sosa, 124 S. Ct. at 2764 ("Erie did not in terms bar any judicial recognition of
new substantive rules, no matter what the circumstances, and post-Erie understanding has
identified limited enclaves in which federal courts may derive some substantive law in a
common law way."). See generally Henry J. Friendly, In Praise of Erie-And of the New
Federal Common Law, 39 N.Y.U. L. ReV. 383 (1964).
18. Philip C. Jessup, The Doctrine of Erie Railroad v. Tompkins Applied to International
Law, 33 AM. J. INT'L L. 740, 741 (1939).
19. Id. at 743.
20. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 425 (1964) ("[Jessup] cautioned
that rules of international law should not be left to divergent and perhaps parochial state
interpretations. His basic rationale is equally applicable to the act of state doctrine.").
21. ld.; see also Texas Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 641 (1981)
("[FJederal common law exists only in such narrow areas as those concerned with...
international disputes implicating ... our relations with foreign nations .... ).
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considered to be like common law in the United States, but it is federal
law. ,22
B. The Bradley-Goldsmith Critique
In 1997, Professors Curtis Bradley and Jack Goldsmith took aim at
this orthodox view.23 First, they noted its potentially far-reaching
implications. "If CIL [customary international law] has the status of
federal common law," they wrote, "it presumably preempts inconsistent
state law pursuant to the Supremacy Clause and provides a basis for
Article III 'arising under' jurisdiction. It may also bind the President
under Article II's Take Care Clause.,
24
Second, they argued that Erie had changed everything by requiring a
sovereign source for every rule of decision.2 After Erie, a federal court
can no longer apply customary international law in the absence of some
domestic authorization to do so, as it could under the regime of general
common law.26 Pre-Erie decisions applying the law of nations as general
common law provided no authority to apply the law of nations as federal
common law." Nor was there any such authorization in the U.S.
Constitution or in federal statutes.28 Therefore, Bradley and Goldsmith
concluded, federal courts could not apply customary international law
unless it had been incorporated into state law.29
22. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 111 cmt. d (1987).
23. Bradley and Goldsmith refer to the orthodox view as the "modern position," Bradley
& Goldsmith, supra note 13, at 816, but it is in fact no more modern than their own view
that customary international law should be considered state law. Both views try to fit
customary international law into the post-Erie framework. Only a few commentators have
maintained that courts may continue to apply customary international law today as pre-Erie
general common law. See, e.g., Young, supra note 13, at 370-71; Weisburd, supra note 13, at
49.
24. Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 13, at 817; see also id. at 838-48 (elaborating these
implications).
25. Id. at 852.
26. Id. at 852-53.
27. Id. at 853; see also id. at 849.
28. Id. at 856-57.
29. Id. at 870. They further reasoned that "[i]f a state chooses to incorporate CIL
[customary international lawl into state law, then the federal courts would be bound to
apply the state interpretation of CIL on issues not otherwise governed by federal law." Id.
Sabbatino was not to the contrary, Bradley and Goldsmith argued, because it had
technically held that the act of state doctrine, not customary international law, was federal
common law, and because Sabbatino had in fact applied the act of state doctrine to preclude
federal courts from enforcing rules of customary international law. Id. at 859-60.
20041
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C. The Issue in Sosa
The central issue in Sosa was the proper role of federal courts in
applying customary international law. Under the orthodox view, federal
courts may apply customary international law as federal law in any case
over which they have jurisdiction.30 Under the Bradley-Goldsmith view,
federal courts may not apply customary international law unless Congress
(or the states) has expressly authorized them to do so.3" Petitioner Sosa
and the Bush Administration advanced the Bradley-Goldsmith view,
arguing that the ATS was purely jurisdictional and that further
congressional authorization in the form of an express, statutory cause of
action was necessary before suits could be brought under this provision.
Although the Supreme Court agreed that the ATS is purely jurisdictional,
it rejected the argument that further congressional action was necessary
before a federal court could apply customary international law. 2
III. THE SOSA DECISION
The events that gave rise to the Sosa case began nearly two decades
ago. At the behest of the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA),
a group of Mexicans (including Sosa) abducted Alvarez, a Mexican doctor,
and brought him to the United States to be tried for alleged involvement in
the torture and murder of a DEA agent.33 Alvarez moved to dismiss the
indictment because of the government's conduct, but the Supreme Court
held that his abduction did not affect the jurisdiction of the district court.'
At trial, the district court granted Alvarez's motion for a judgment of
acquittal after the close of the government's case. Alvarez then sued the
United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act, and sued his Mexican
abductors under the ATS. The district court awarded $25,000 in damages
against Sosa, which the Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding that Alvarez's
30. See supra notes 18-22 and accompanying text.
31. See supra notes 23-29 and accompanying text. This difference in views tracks the
monism/dualism debate. As Professor Henkin explains, "[m]onists view international and
domestic law as together constituting a single legal system," while "dualists view
international law as a discrete legal system." Louis Henkin, The Constitution and United
States Sovereignty: A Century of Chinese Exclusion and Its Progeny, 100 HARV. L. REV.
853, 864 (1987). The Bradley-Goldsmith position is dualist, in that it requires Congress to
incorporate customary international law before that law may be applied as domestic law.
See also J. G. Starke, Monism and Dualism in the Theory of International Law, 17 BRIT.
Y.B. INT'L L. 66 (1936); Gerald Fitzmaurice, The General Principles of International Law
Considered from the Standpoint of the Rule of Law, 92 RECUEIL DES COURS 1, 70-85 (1957).
32. Sosa, 124 S. Ct. at 2755.
33. Id. at 2746-47.
34. United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655 (1992).
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arrest violated a customary international law norm against arbitrary arrest
and detention.35
The ATS began as a provision of the Judiciary Act of 1789, which
36
established the federal courts. Agreeing with petitioner Sosa, the
Supreme Court held that the ATS was strictly jurisdictional and did not
create any new causes of action.37 But as the Court noted, "holding the
ATS jurisdictional raises a new question, this one about the interaction
between the ATS at the time of its enactment and the ambient law of the
era." 3 After an extensive review of the history of the ATS and the First
Congress's understanding of the law of nations, the Court concluded that
"[tihe jurisdictional grant is best read as having been enacted on the
understanding that the common law would provide a cause of action for
the modest number of international law violations with a potential for
personal liability at the time."'39
The Court went on to hold that federal courts may recognize claims
"based on the present-day law of nations [that] . . . rest on a norm of
international character accepted by the civilized world and defined with a
specificity comparable to the features of the 18th-century paradigms we
have recognized."4" To justify this "restrained conception of the discretion
35. Alvarez-Machain v. United States, 331 F.3d 604 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc), rev'd sum
nom. Sosa, 124 S. Ct. 2739 (2004), vacated sub nom. Alvarez-Machain v. United States, 374
F.3d 1384 (2004).
36. As originally enacted, the ATS provided that the district courts "shall also have
cognizance, concurrent with the courts of the several States, or the circuit courts, as the case
may be, of all causes where an alien sues for a tort only in violation of the law of nations or
a treaty of the United States." An Act to establish the Judicial Courts of the United States,
ch. 20, § 9, 1 Stat. 73, 77 (1789) [hereinafter Judiciary Act]. As the Sosa Court noted, "[t]he
statute has been slightly modified on a number of occasions since its original enactment,"
Sosa, 124 S. Ct. at 2755 n.10, and now reads: "The district courts shall have original
jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law
of nations or a treaty of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 1350. The Court did not suggest
that these changes in wording had changed the meaning of the ATS.
37. Sosa, 124 S. Ct. at 2755.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 2761.
40. Id. at 2761-62. Those 18th-century paradigms are violations of safe conduct,
infringement of the rights of ambassadors, and piracy. Id. at 2761. One writer has argued
that Sosa requires actionable norms to share six specific characteristics with piracy, a test no
modern human rights norm can pass, not even torture. See Eugene Kontorovich,
Implementing Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain: What Piracy Teaches About the Limits of the Alien
Tort Statute, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. (forthcoming 2004), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfmabstract-id=592161. Suffice it to say that this
argument ignores the Supreme Court's own statement that its test is generally consistent
with the lower court decisions since Filartiga. See infra note 45 and accompanying text.
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a federal court should exercise in considering a new cause of action of this
kind,"4 the Court invoked a series of modern reasons that "argue for
judicial caution": 41 (1) changes in "the prevailing conception of the
common law";43 (2) Erie's restrictions on common-law making by the
federal courts; (3) the primary role of Congress in creating private rights of
action today; (4) foreign relations implications; and (5) the lack of a
"congressional mandate to seek out and define new and debatable
violations of the law of nations.'" 4 However, the restraint imposed by the
Sosa Court, was no more than the lower courts had already been exercising
in cases under the ATS.
This limit upon judicial recognition is generally consistent with the
reasoning of many of the courts and judges who faced the issue before it
reached this Court. See Filartiga v. Pena-lrala, 630 F.2d 876, 890 (2d
Cir. 1980) ("for purposes of civil liability, the torturer has become like
the pirate and slave trader before him hostis humani generis, an enemy
of all mankind"); Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 781
(D.C. Cir. 1984) (Edwards, J., concurring) (suggesting that the limits of
§ 1350's reach be defined by "a handful of heinous actions - each of
which violates definable, universal and obligatory norms"); see also In re
Estate of Ferdinand Marco, Human Rights Litigation, 25 F.3d 1467, 1475
(9th Cir. 1994) ("Actionable violations of international law must be of a
norm that is specific, universal, and obligatory.")."
At the end of the day, Alvarez's claim of arbitrary detention did not satisfy
this test. The Court concluded: "It is enough to hold that a single illegal
detention of less than a day, followed by the transfer of custody to lawful
authorities and a prompt arraignment, violates no norm of customary
international law so well defined as to support the creation of a federal
remedy.
4 6
A. Customary International Law as Federal Common Law
Beyond its endorsement of Filartiga, the Sosa decision speaks directly
to the evolving role of customary international law in the U.S. legal system.
All of the Justices agreed that in 1789 "torts in violation of the law of
41. Sosa, 124 S. Ct. at 2761.
42. Id. at 2762.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 2763. For further discussion, see infra notes 69-79 and accompanying text.
45. Id. at 2765-66. Cf id. at 2775 (Scalia, J., concurring) ("Endorsing the very formula
that led the Ninth Circuit to its result in this case hardly seems to be a recipe for restraint in
the future.").
46. Sosa, 124 S. Ct. at 2769.
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nations would have been recognized within the common law of the time., 47
Where they parted company was over the effect Erie should have on the
federal courts ability to apply customary international law today.
Justice Scalia, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Thomas,
argued that federal courts could no longer apply customary international
law as general common law, because the Court had closed that door in
Erie.4 Tracking Bradley's and Goldsmith's arguments,49 Justice Scalia
noted that "[b]ecause post-Erie federal common law is made, not
discovered, federal courts must possess some federal-common-law-making
authority before undertaking to craft it.""' Neither pre-Erie decisions
applying the law of nations nor the ATS itself provide such authority
because "[p]ost-Erie federal common lawmaking ... is so far removed
from that general-common-law adjudication which applied the 'law of
nations' that it would be anachronistic to find authorization to do the
former in a statutory grant of jurisdiction that was thought to enable the
latter.""'
A six-Justice majority, however, rejected the Bradley-Goldsmith-
Scalia view. 2 While noting that Erie involved a "significant rethinking of
the federal courts' role in making common law,' 3 the Court observed:
Erie did not in terms bar any judicial recognition of new substantive
rules, no matter what the circumstances, and post-Erie understanding
has identified limited enclaves in which federal courts may derive some
substantive law in a common law way. For two centuries we have
47. Id. at 2755. Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice Scalia, and Justice Thomas joined Part III
of the Court's opinion. See id. at 2769 (Scalia, J., concurring); see also id. at 2770 ("The law
of nations that would have been applied in this federal forum was at the time part of the so-
called general common law."). The Court's understanding is consistent with the scholarly
consensus that the law of nations was understood to be part of the general common law.
See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
48. Sosa, 124 S. Ct. at 2774 (Scalia, J., concurring); see also id. at 2770-71 ("Erie affected
the status of the law of nations in federal courts not merely by the implication of its holding
but quite directly, since the question decided in Swift turned on the 'law merchant,' then a
subset of the law of nations.").
49. See supra notes 23-29 and accompanying text.
50. Sosa, 124 S. Ct. at 2771 (Scalia, J., concurring).
51. Id. at 2773.
52. The Court also rejected the Bradley-Goldsmith reading of Sabbatino. See supra note
29. "Sabbatino itself did not directly apply international law," the Court acknowledged,
"but neither did it question the application of that law in appropriate cases, and it further
endorsed the reasoning of a noted commentator [Jessup] who had argued that Erie should
not preclude the continued application of international law in federal courts." Sosa, 124 S.
Ct. at 2765, n.18.
53. Sosa, 124 S. Ct. at 2762.
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affirmed that the domestic law of the United States recognizes the law
of nations.... We think it would be unreasonable to assume that the
First Congress would have expected federal courts to lose all capacity to
recognize enforceable international norms simply because the common
law might lose some metaphysical cachet on the road to modern
realism."4
Thus, the Court held that federal courts could recognize claims under
the ATS "based on the present-day law of nations."55  Moreover, it
expressly characterized such claims as "claims under federal common
law. ,,56
B. The Court's Particularized Approach
What, then, are the implications of the Court's holding for customary
international law in non-ATS cases? In a footnote, Justice Scalia said:
"[A] judicially created federal rule based on international norms would be
supreme federal law. Moreover, a federal-common-law cause of action...
would 'arise under' the laws of the United States, not only for purposes of
Article III but also for purposes of statutory federal-question
jurisdiction."57  The Court responded with a footnote of its own.
Notwithstanding the holding in Illinois v. Milwaukee, "that § 1331
jurisdiction will support claims founded upon federal common law as well
as those of a statutory origin," 8 the Sosa majority denied that cases
involving customary international law would arise under the laws of the
United States for purposes of the federal question statute: "[The ATS] was
enacted on the congressional understanding that courts would exercise
jurisdiction by entertaining some common law claims derived from the law
of nations; and we know of no reason to think that federal-question
jurisdiction was extended subject to any comparable congressional
assumption., 59 The Court did not respond to Justice Scalia with respect to
Article III or the Supremacy Clause of Article VI.
In contrast with the all-or-nothing approach of Justice Scalia,' and of
Professors Bradley and Goldsmith,"' the Court seems to prefer a more
54. Id. at 2764-65. The Court added that "[l]ater Congresses seem to have shared our
view" and had acted to supplement Filartiga rather than to overrule it. Id. at 2765.
55. Id. at 2761.
56. Id. at 2765.
57. Id. at 2773, n.* (Scalia, J., concurring) (emphasis omitted).
58. 406 U.S. 91,100 (1972).
59. Sosa, 124 S. Ct. at 2765 n.19.
60. Id. at 2773 n.* (Scalia, J., concurring).
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particularized approach that looks at the incorporation of customary
international law into the U.S. legal system issue-by-issue.6 2 Customary
international law may be federal common law for purposes of the ATS, but
not for the purposes of § 1331. Where this leaves customary international
law with respect to other statutory and constitutional provisions Sosa does
not say, but its methodology may provide some clues.
C. Sosa's Two-Part Analysis
Both in Sosa's analysis of the ATS and in its much briefer discussion
of § 1331, one sees the same two-part analysis. The Court began with the
understanding of those who enacted the provision. In the case of the ATS,
the First Congress understood that "'[w]hen the United States declared
their independence, they were bound to receive the law of nations, in its
modern state of purity and refinement.' ' 63 That law proscribed individual
61. See Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 13, at 817. Some of Bradley and Goldsmith's
opponents have adopted a similar all-or-nothing position. See, e.g., Stephens, supra note
13, at 393-94:
If international law is part of federal law, it provides the basis for federal
court jurisdiction over cases raising well-pleaded international law claims.
Moreover, if international law is part of federal law, it is the law of land,
binding on the states pursuant to the supremacy clause; and state courts
are bound to follow federal court decisions as to its meaning.
See also Henkin, supra note 16, at 1559-60:
[T]here is now general agreement that international law, as incorporated
into domestic law in the United States, is federal, not state law; that cases
arising under international law are "cases arising under... the Laws of
the United States" and therefore are within the judicial power to the
United States under article III of the Constitution; that principles of
international law as incorporated in the law of the United States are
"Laws of the United States" and supreme under article VI; that
international law, therefore, is to be determined independently by the
federal courts, and ultimately by the United States Supreme Court, with
its determination binding on the state courts; and that a determination of
international law by a state court is a federal question subject to review by
the Supreme Court.
62. Some academic writing has also suggested an issue-by-issue approach. See, e.g.,
Michael D. Ramsey, International Law as Part of Our Law: A Constitutional Perspective, 29
PEPPERD[NE L. REV. 187, 188 (2001) ("I argue that the Bradley/Goldsmith position, rather
than being a single claim about the status of international law, is properly viewed as a series
of claims about particular parts of the Constitution, some of which are more persuasive
than others"); William S. Dodge, The Constitutionality of the Alien Tort Statute: Some
Observations on Text and Context, 42 VA. J. INT'L L. 687, 702 n.82 (2002) [hereinafter The
Constitutionality of the Alien Tort Statute] ("One may disaggregate Bradley and
Goldsmith's argument into at least... six questions.").
63. Sosa, 124 S. Ct. at 2755 (quoting Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. 199, 281 (1796) (Wilson, J.)).
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offenses against the law of nations, including "violation of safe conducts,
infringement of the rights of ambassadors, and piracy."' The Court noted
the extensive efforts of both the Continental Congress and the First
Congress to address violations of the law of nations,65 reasoning that
"[there is too much in the historical record to believe that Congress would
have enacted the ATS only to leave it lying fallow indefinitely. 6 6 Instead,
after examining contemporaneous sources on the relationship between the
law of nations and the common law,67 the Court concluded that the ATS
"is best read as having been enacted on the understanding that the
common law would provide a cause of action for the modest number of
international law violations with a potential for personal liability at the
tim e.,68
The First Congress's original understanding of the relationship
between the law of nations and the ATS was just the beginning of the
Court's analysis. In Part IV of its decision, the Court turned to a series of
modern developments that "argue for judicial caution when considering
the kinds of individual claims that might implement the jurisdiction
conferred by the early statute. First, the prevailing conception of the
common law has changed since 1789. "69 Thus, today "there is a general
understanding that the law is not so much found or discovered as it is
either made or created."7" Second, Erie changed the role of the federal
courts in making common law, relegating them to "havens of specialty."'71
Third, these days the Court generally leaves decisions about whether to
create a private right of action to Congress." Fourth, creating private
rights of action for violating international law in particular may have
foreign relations implications.
It is one thing for American courts to enforce constitutional limits on
our own State and Federal Governments' power, but quite another to
consider suits under rules that would go so far as to claim a limit on the
64. Id. at 2756.
65. Id. at 2756-58.
66. Id. at 2758-59.
67. Id. at 2759-61.
68. Sosa, 124 S. Ct. at 2761.
69. Id. at 2762.
70. Id. One might question that characterization as applied to customary international
law, which derives from the general practice of states. "Unlike federal common law,
customary international law is not made and developed by the federal courts independently
and in the exercise of their own law-making judgment. In a real sense federal courts find
international law rather than make it . Henkin, supra note 16, at 1561-62.
71. Sosa, 124 S. Ct. at 2762.
72. Id. at 2762-63.
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power of foreign governments over their own citizens; and to hold that a
foreign government or its agent has transgressed those limits.73
Finally, Congress has also given the courts no "mandate to seek out
and define new and debatable violations of the law of nations," and indeed
"declined to give the federal courts the task of interpreting and applying
international human rights law" when it made the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights non-self-executing."'
It is not clear whether these modern developments impose additional
limitations on the ATS or simply reinforce its inherent limitations.75 After
all, the ATS does not grant jurisdiction over all tort actions by aliens, but
only over those "committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of
the United States. 7 6 This law-of-nations test is a stringent one. Contrary
to the views of some critics, customary international law does not derive
from the morality of law professors," but rather from "a general and
consistent practice of states followed by them from a sense of legal
obligation."78 Thus, the ATS itself requires the "vigilant doorkeeping" of
which Sosa speaks."9 What is clear is that the Sosa Court was attempting to
find a middle ground - one that would give effect as to the expectations of
the First Congress while also taking seriously more modern concerns.
The Court's brief discussion of § 1331 displays the same two-part
approach. It first looked to the original understanding of the provision,
which was enacted in 1875, observing that "we know of no reason to think
that federal-question jurisdiction was extended subject to any comparable
congressional assumption," that is, to any "understanding that courts
73. Id. at 2763.
74. Id.
75. Cf William S. Dodge, Which Torts in Violation of the Law of Nations, 24 HASTINGS
INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 351, 355 (2001) ("One might argue that the phrase 'universal,
definable, and obligatory' is simply a way of restating the requirements for recognizing a
rule of customary international law.").
76. 28 U.S.C. § 1350.
77. See, e.g., Robert H. Bork, Judicial Imperialism, WALL ST. J., July 12, 2004, at A16.
78. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 102(2) (1987); see also The
Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677,700 (1900):
[W]here there is no treaty and no controlling executive or legislative act
or judicial decision, resort must be had to the customs and usages of
civilized nations, and, as evidence of these, to the works of jurists and
commentators who by years of labor, research, and experience have made
themselves peculiarly well acquainted with the subjects of which they
treat. Such works are resorted to by judicial tribunals, not for the
speculations of their authors concerning what the law ought to be, but for
trustworthy evidence of what the law really is.
79. Sosa, 124 S. Ct. at 2764.
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would exercise jurisdiction by entertaining some common law claims
derived from the law of nations."8 But the Court also took into account
changes in the U.S. legal system since 1875: "our holding today [with
respect to the ATS] is consistent with the division of responsibilities
between federal and state courts after Erie... as a more expansive
common law power related to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 might not be."8 '
In sum, Sosa's methodology attempts to bridge a gap not just between
the international and the domestic, but between the past and the present.
In determining the relationship between customary international law and a
particular legal provision, both the original understanding of those who
enacted the provision and modern developments in the U.S. legal system
are relevant, but neither is determinative. In building a bridge to link the
past and the present, the Court works from both sides.
IV. SOSA'S ANALYSIS APPLIED
The Sosa Court's particularized approach left a series of questions
unanswered. While the Court has now clearly held that federal courts may
apply customary international law as federal common law under the ATS,82
and has strongly suggested that the general federal question statute does
not extend to cases arising under customary international law,83 the Court
chose not to discuss the status of customary international law under Article
III or the Supremacy Clause of Article VI, despite Justice Scalia's
goading.8s  To answer these questions (and others concerning the
relationship between customary international law and various
constitutional"' and statutory& provisions) one might use Sosa's two-part
analysis.
80. Id. at 2765 n.19.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 2765.
83. Id. at n.19.
84. See supra notes 57-59 and accompanying text.
85. Articles III and VI are not the only provisions of the Constitution to which customary
international law may be relevant. The President has a constitutional duty to "take Care
that the Laws be faithfully executed." U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3. Some have argued that this
duty extends to customary international law, see, e.g., Henkin, supra note 16, at 1567;
Michael J. Glennon, Raising the Paquete Habana: Is Violation of Customary International
Law by the Executive Unconstitutional?, 80 Nw. U. L. REV. 321, 325 (1985), while others
have maintained that "[c]ustomary international law. .. cannot bind the executive branch
under the Constitution because it is not federal law." Application of Treaties and Laws to
al Qaeda and Taliban Detainees, Memorandum for Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the
President, and William J. Haynes 1I, General Counsel of the Department of Defense 32




The relationship between customary international law and Article III
has important implications for ATS cases. Unless customary international
law is part of the "Laws of the United States" 87 for purposes of Article III,
the Filartiga-type suits that the Supreme Court endorsed in Sosa8 would
appear to be unconstitutional because the parties to such suits are both
aliens and these suits would therefore fall outside Article III's grant of
alienage jurisdiction."'
http://www2.gwu.edu/-nsarchiv/NSAEBBNSAEBB127/02.01.22.pdf. Although a full
analysis is beyond the scope of this article, the original understanding appears to be that the
Take Care Clause encompasses the law of nations. See Alexander Hamilton, Letters of
Pacificus, No. 1 (1793), reprinted in 15 THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 33, 40
(Harold C. Syrett ed., 1969) ("The Executive is charged with the execution of all laws, the
laws of Nations as well as the Municipal law, which recognises and adopts those laws"); id.
at 43 ("The President is the constitutional EXECUTOR of the laws. Our Treaties and the
laws of Nations form a part of the law of the land"); see also James Madison, Letters of
Helvidius, No. 2 (1793), reprinted in 15 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 86 (Thomas A.
Mason et al. eds., 1985) (referring to Hamilton's point about the law of nations as a
"truth"). Even if customary international law is within the Take Care Clause, however,
other barriers such as the political question doctrine or standing requirements may make it
difficult to enforce this obligation against the President. See Henkin, supra note 16, at 1567
n.41.
86. For example, 28 U.S.C. § 1257(a), allows the Supreme Court to review state court
decisions "where the validity of a statute of any State is drawn in question on the ground of
its being repugnant to the Constitution, treaties, or laws of the United States." In New
York Life Ins. Co. v. Hendren, 92 U.S. 286 (1875), the Court held under a predecessor
statute that it had no jurisdiction to review a state court interpretation of the law of nations.
Hendren's holding would seem to be a prime candidate for reconsideration. See infra notes
110-33 (discussing the status of customary international law under the Supremacy Clause).
The decision in Oliver American Trading Co. v. Mex., 264 U.S. 440 (1924), that questions of
customary international law are not a basis for removal to federal court, on the other hand,
appears secure after Sosa. The current statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1441, ties removal to the
original jurisdiction of the district court, and under Sosa's interpretation of § 1331, the
district courts would lack jurisdiction over claims arising under customary international law.
See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
87. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
88. See supra notes 3, 45 and accompanying text.
89. See Curtis A. Bradley, The Alien Tort Statute and Article III, 42 VA. J. INT'L L. 587
(2002). It might seem curious that the petitioner in Sosa did not raise this argument, since
both parties in that case were aliens. I suspect the explanation is that the Article III
argument would not have halted the alien tort suits now pending against many U.S.
corporations, over which the federal courts clearly do have alienage jurisdiction under
Article III. Counsel for the petitioner in Sosa was also counsel for Unocal in an alien tort
case that subsequently settled. See Edward Alden et al., Unocal Pays Out in Burma Abuse
Case, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 14, 2004, at 12.
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As I have argued at length elsewhere,' ° the original understanding of
Article III was that the law of nations was part of "the Laws of the United
States."9' Starting with the text, one may contrast Article III's phrase with
Article VI's reference to the "Laws of the United States which shall be
made in Pursuance [of the Constitution]." ' The difference in language
suggests that there is at least one category of laws not "made in
Pursuance" of the Constitution that are still "Laws of the United States"
for the purpose of Article III. Indeed, the Constitutional Convention
deliberately struck the words "passed by the Legislature" from the text of
Article III reported by the Committee of Detail. Many of the delegates to
the Convention sought to create a judiciary with jurisdiction over all cases
involving the law of nations,9" and many of them thought this was precisely
what they had done. 5 To give just one example, John Jay wrote in
Federalist No. 3:
Under the national government, treaties and articles of treaties, as well
as the laws of nations, will always be expounded in one sense and
executed in the same manner-whereas adjudications on the same
points and questions in thirteen States, or in three or four confederacies,
will not always accord or be consistent[.] ... The wisdom of the
convention in committing such questions to the jurisdiction and
judgment of courts appointed by and responsible only to one national
government cannot be too much commended.9'
The First Congress reflected this understanding of Article III in the
ATS when it granted the district courts jurisdiction over "all causes where
an alien sues for a tort only in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of
the United States.""' Indeed, if the ATS were limited by Article III to suits
against citizens of the United States, it would not reach cases like the
Marbois incident, which the Sosa Court noted was one of the motivations
90. The Constitutionality of the Alien Tort Statute, supra note 62, at 701-11.
91. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
92. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
93. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 423-24, 431 (Max Farrand
ed., 1911) [hereinafter 2 FARRAND].
94. See, e.g., Letter from George Mason as to Arthur Lee (May 21, 1787), reprinted in 3
THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 24 (Max Farrand ed., 1911) ("The
most prevalent idea [was] ... to establish.., a judiciary system with cognizance of all such
matters as depend upon the law of nations, and such other objects as the local courts of
justice may be inadequate to .. "); see also The Constitutionality of the Alien Tort Statute,
supra note 62, at 705-06.
95. See The Constitutionality of the Alien Tort Statute, supra note 62, at 707-09.
96. THE FEDERALIST No. 3, at 41, 43 (John Jay) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
97. See Judiciary Act, supra note 36, at ch. 20, § 9 (emphasis added).
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for the ATS.9 Oliver Ellsworth, who drafted the ATS, 9 also served on the
Committee of Detail at the Constitutional Convention' °° and presumably
understood the scope of Article III.
Although many aspects of the U.S. legal system have changed since
1787, the need for a uniform, federal interpretation of customary
international law that Jay expressed in Federalist No. 3 has not. In
Sabbatino, the Court noted a pervasive "concern for uniformity in this
country's dealings with foreign nations and.., desire to give matters of
international significance to the jurisdiction of federal institutions. 101
Also, in Texas Industries, Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., the Court noted
the "'uniquely federal interests'... [in] international disputes
implicating.., our relations with foreign nations.''0'
None of the reasons for caution noted by the Sosa Court10 3 apply with
greater force in the context of Article III than they did with respect to the
ATS. Indeed, those reasons having to do with the desirability of
"legislative guidance,"' '" "legislative judgment, '  nd a "congressional
98. Sosa, 124 S. Ct. at 2757. The 1784 Marbois incident arose from an assault by a French
adventurer the Chevalier de Longchamps upon the French Consul General, Francis Barbe
Marbois. For further discussion, see William S. Dodge, The Historical Origins of the Alien
Tort Statute: A Response to the "Originalists," 19 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 221,
229-30 (1996) [hereinafter The Historical Origins of the Alien Tort Statute]; William R.
Casto, The Federal Courts' Protective Jurisdiction Over Torts Committed in Violation of the
Law of Nations, 18 CONN. L. REV. 467, 491-94 (1986).
99. Sosa, 124 S. Ct. at 2758.
100. 2 FARRAND, supra note 93, at 97-98. Other members of the Committee of Detail
included James Wilson and Edmund Randolph. Wilson had been specially retained to
assist in the prosecution of Marbois's assailant. See Casto, supra note 98, at 492 n.141.
Randolph had drafted the 1781 resolution of the Continental Congress that was the
forerunner of the ATS, see 21 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 1774-1789, at
1136-37 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1912), and complained in his opening speech to the
Constitutional Convention of the Continental Congress's inability to "cause infractions of
treaties or of the law of nations, to be punished." 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL
CONVENTION OF 1787, at 19 (Max Farrand ed., 1911).
101. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 427 n.25.
102. 451 U.S. 630, 640-41 (1981) (quoting Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 426); see also American
Ins. Assoc. v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 413-14 (2003) (quoting Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 427
n.25) (noting "the 'concern for uniformity in this country's dealings with foreign nations'
that animated the Constitution's allocation of the foreign relations power to the National
Government"); Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 381-82 & n.16 (2000)
(noting interest in speaking with "one voice" in foreign affairs).
103. See supra notes 69-79 and accompanying text.
104. Sosa, 124 S. Ct. at 2762.
105. Id.
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mandate"' ' are significantly weaker. The judicial power established by
Article III is not self-vesting. °7 At a minimum, congressional action giving
the federal courts statutory jurisdiction over cases involving the law of
nations is required." Thus, interpreting Article III's phrase "the Laws of
the United States" to embrace customary international law does not raise
the specter of unbridled judicial involvement in foreign affairs."'°
In sum, although Sosa does not answer the question whether cases
arising under customary international law fall within Article III's grant of
federal-question jurisdiction, Sosa's analysis strongly suggests that the
answer is yes, for both history and sound policy support it.
B. Article VI
The status of customary international law under the Supremacy
Clause of Article VI" also has important implications. Those that have
received the most attention are the limits that customary international law
might place upon the states' ability to impose the death penalty."' The
Supreme Court has previously looked to the practices of other nations to
determine "evolving standards of decency" ''  under the Eighth
Amendment,"3 but the application of customary international law through
106. Id. at 2763.
107. See Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 807 (1986) (Article
III's "grant of power.., is not self-executing"); see also Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. 441, 449
(1850) ("Courts created by statute can have no jurisdiction but such as the statute confers.
No one of them can assert a just claim to jurisdiction exclusively conferred on another, or
withheld from all.").
108. In the modern era, further action conferring an express cause of action may be
necessary. See, e.g., Torture Victim Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 256, 106 Stat. 73 (1992).
109. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. The Sosa Court's statement that § 1331's federal-
question jurisdiction does not extend to claims under the law of nations, 124 S. Ct. at 2765
n.19, does not foreclose that possibility under Article III. Although § 1331's language
tracks that of Article III, the Court has "long construed the statutory grant of federal-
question jurisdiction as conferring a more limited power." Merrell Dow, 478 U.S. at 807.
110. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
111. See, e.g., Curtis A. Bradley, The Juvenile Death Penalty and International Law, 52
DUKE L.J. 485, 550-54 (2002); see also Lea Brilmayer, Federalism, State Authority, and the
Preemptive Power of International Law, 1994 Sup. CT. REV. 295, 322-26; Sosa, 124 S. Ct. at
2776 (Scalia, J., concurring) ("The Framers would, I am confident, be appalled by the
proposition that, for example, the American peoples' democratic adoption of the death
penalty... could be judicially nullified because of the disapproving views of foreigners.").
112. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (plurality opinion).
113. See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 316 n.21 (2002) ("within the world community,
the imposition of the death penalty for crimes committed by mentally retarded offenders is
overwhelmingly disapproved"); see also Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988)
(plurality opinion) ("the conclusion that it would offend civilized standards of decency to
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the Supremacy Clause would be an alternative means of holding the States
to international standards."1
4
The text of the Supremacy Clause does not mention the law of
nations: "This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall
be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be
made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law
of the Land....""' The omission can be explained, however, by looking
to "the ambient law of the era.""6 Because the law of nations was general
common law, it was already binding on the states 7 and there was
consequently no need to list it."" "The law of nations of the time was not
seen as something imposed on the states by the new U.S. government; it
had been binding on and accepted by the states before the U.S.
government was even established.' 9 Moreover, the law of nations was
understood to be immutable, in the sense that it could not be altered by
legislation.2 Vattel had written that "[wihence, as this law is immutable..
. and the obligations that arise from it necessary and indispensable, nations
execute a person who was less than 16 years old at the time of his or her offense.... is also
consistent with the views expressed... by other nations that share our Anglo-American
heritage, and by the leading members of the Western European community"); Enmund v.
Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 796, n.22 (1982) ("the doctrine of felony murder has been abolished
in England and India, severely restricted in Canada and a number of other Commonwealth
countries, and is unknown in continental Europe"); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 596,
n.10 (1977) ("It is thus not irrelevant here that out of 60 major nations in the world
surveyed in 1965, only 3 retained the death penalty for rape where death did not ensue.").
But see Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 US 361, 369 n.1 (1989) ("We emphasize that it is
American conceptions of decency that are dispositive, rejecting the contention of
petitioners and their various amici.., that the sentencing practices of other countries are
relevant.").
114. Brilmayer, supra note 111, at 325.
115. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
116. Sosa, 124 S. Ct. at 2755.
117. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
118. The Status of Law of Nations, supra note 14, at 832 ("The status of the law of nations
as general law also explains the omission of it and any other type of common law from the
supremacy clause ....").
119. Henkin, supra note 16, at 1566.
120. The Status of Law of Nations, supra note 14, at 827 ("Jurists of this era also typically
recited that as to its obligatory elements the law of nations could not be violated by positive
enactments."). The framers nonetheless understood that the law of nations could evolve.
As Justice Wilson wrote in Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. 199 (1796), "[wlhen the United States
declared their independence, they were bound to receive the law of nations, in its modem
state of purity and refinement." Id. at 281 (Wilson, J., concurring), quoted in Sosa, 124 S. Ct.
at 2755 (second emphasis added); see also The Historical Origins of the Alien Tort Statute,
supra note 98, at 241-43.
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can neither make any changes in it by their conventions, dispense with it in
their own conduct, nor reciprocally release each other from the observance
of it."'' 21 Justice James Iredell explained that "'[elven the Legislature
cannot rightfully controul' [the law of nations] .... ,,122 Thus, in contrast to
the local common law, which the states were free to alter, "[g]eneral
common law was... 'binding' on the states by the very nature of its
transnational character .... ,123 The expectation of the Framers, then, was
that the law of nations would bind the states in the same way as the
Constitution, federal legislation, and treaties notwithstanding its omission
from the Supremacy Clause.
With respect to Article VI, modern developments seem to strengthen
the case for the supremacy of customary international law.14 First, the
Supreme Court has held that other sources of law, though not specifically
enumerated in Article VI, are nevertheless supreme over state law. In
United States v. Belmont,125 decided the year before Erie, the Court held
that an executive agreement preempted inconsistent state law. In regard
to supremacy, the Court reasoned that:
while this rule in respect of treaties is established by the express
language of cl. 2, Art. VI, of the Constitution, the same rule would result
in the case of all international compacts and agreements from the very
fact that complete power over international affairs is in the national
government and is not and cannot be subject to any curtailment or
interference on the part of the several states.'2
The Court reaffirmed this holding just four years after Erie in United
States v. Pink.2 7  Belmont's reasoning applies equally to customary
international law. Although the supremacy of customary international law
is not established by the express language of Article VI, it nevertheless
follows "from the very fact that complete power over international affairs
121. EMMERICH DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS, PRELIMINARIES 9 (Joseph Chitty trans.
& ed., 1883).
122. Charge to the Grand Jury for the District of South Carolina (May 12, 1794), quoted in
Jay, supra note 14, at 827.
123. Stewart Jay, Origins of Federal Common Law: Part Two, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 1231,
1275 (1985).
124. Article Vt thus presents a contrast to the ATS, where the Supreme Court arguably
used modern developments to limit the First Congress's understanding. See Sosa v.
Alvarez-Machain, 124 S. Ct. at 2761-63.
125. 301 U.S. 324 (1937).
126. td. at 331.
127. 315 U.S. 203, 230 (1942).
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is in the national government and is not and cannot be subject to any
curtailment or interference on the part of the several states. ' , 2S
Second, Sosa's concern about foreign relations cuts the other way in
this context. The Sosa Court observed:
It is one thing for American courts to enforce constitutional limits on
our own State and Federal Governments' power, but quite another to
consider suits under rules that would go so far as to claim a limit on the
power of foreign governments over their own citizens, and to hold that a
foreign government or its agent has transgressed those limits,
121
In spite of this concern, the Court did interpret the ATS to allow suits
against foreign actors for violations of customary international law. As the
quoted language suggests, holding the states to their obligations under
customary international law should be comparatively unproblematic from
the viewpoint of foreign relations. Indeed, recent experience shows that it
is the failure to ensure that the states follow international law that is likely
to cause difficulties with foreign nations. State death sentences imposed
on foreign nationals who were not afforded their rights under the Vienna
Convention on Consular Relations, for example, have led other nations to
sue the United States in the World Court.3° A state attempting to execute
a foreign defendant who is mentally retarded or who committed his crime
as a juvenile might be expected to provoke a similarly hostile response
from other nations.
Finally, it is worth noting that binding the states to observe customary
international law under the Supremacy Clause is arguably less invasive of
state sovereignty than relying on the practices of other nations to interpret
the Eighth Amendment. In contrast to the understanding at the time of
the Framing,'31 it is generally accepted today that Congress may enact
legislation that violates customary international law. This means that
128. Belmont, 301 U.S. at 331; see also Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398,
427 n.25 (1964) (noting "concern for uniformity in this country's dealings with foreign
nations and ... desire to give matters of international significance to the jurisdiction of
federal institutions"); Texas Industries, Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 640-41
(1981) (noting the "uniquely federal interests ... [in] international disputes implicating...
our relations with foreign nations.").
129. Sosa, 124 S. Ct. at 2763.
130. See Avena and other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2004 I.C.I. 128 (Mar. 31); see
also LaGrand (F.R.G. v. U.S.), 2001 I.C.J. 104 (June 27).
131. See supra notes 120-22 and accompanying text.
132. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 115(1)(a) ("An act of
Congress supersedes an earlier rule of international law or a provision of an international
agreement as law of the United States if the purpose of the act to supersede the earlier rule
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Congress could decide to authorize particular state violations of customary
international law and to bear the consequences of such violations. Judicial
interpretations of the Eighth Amendment, by contrast, are not subject to
revision by Congress. '33 Again, although Sosa does not answer the question
directly, its methodology suggests that customary international law should
be given supremacy over state law.
V. CONCLUSION
The relationship between international and domestic law is a complex
subject, made more complex by changes in the U.S. legal system since the
18th century. Sosa is a landmark modern case charting that relationship.
In one sense, the holding of Sosa is narrow - that federal courts may apply
customary international law to a limited set of claims under the ATS
without further congressional authorization. But Sosa's approach of
proceeding issue by issue and of considering both historical and modern
arguments has much broader implications. Sosa has built a fascinating
bridge, and only time will tell precisely where it leads.
or provision is clear or if the act and the earlier rule or provision cannot be fairly
reconciled.").
133. For this reason, I disagree with Professor Young that using international norms to
interpret the Eighth Amendment is the more modest claim. See Young, supra note 13, at
383.
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